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"While it seems clear the lack of battle experience hampered our formations in Normandy, one must 
remark that, although some of the German divisions were subject to the same disability, it appears 
to have had a less serious effect on them. The 12th S.S. Panzer Division, which was responsible 
for many of our troubles, was formed only in 1943 and had never fought before 7 June 1944. (As 
we have seen, however, it did contain a high proportion of experienced officers and N .C.Os. It also 
had the advantage, after the first days of the campaign, of having a commander and a senior staff 
officer who had special knowledge of the theatre of operations, having exercised there with the 1st 
S.S. Panzer Division in 1942.) There were other German divisions committed against us in 
Normandy which had not fought before and which nevertheless gave a good account of themselves. 
This may have been due in part to the fact that the German formations were on the defensive while 
ours were attacking, a more difficult role. Nevertheless, one suspects the Germans contrived to get 
more out oftheir training than we did. Perhaps their attitude towards such matters was less casual 
than ours." 
C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, p.277. 
The Defeat of the 12th SS 
7-10 June 1944 
Oliver Haller 
I n the early hours of 6 June 1944, the first reports of a major Allied operation were 
transmitted to the 12th SS Hitleljugend Panzer 
Division. 1 In anticipation ofthe long-awaited 
Allied invasion of occupied France, a company 
was sent to investigate the Caen area. 2 Though 
the young soldiers of the division were 
uncertain of what actually awaited them, the 
first acts in a conflict that would claim most 
of their lives were being performed. However, 
defeat was not on their minds during that 
hectic morning- the men of the 12th SS were 
fixed on driving the "little fish" back into the 
sea. 
The situation confronting the 12th SS 
on June 7th was not encouraging. The 716th 
Bodenstaendig or Static Division, had lost 
two-thirds of its strength and was reduced to 
isolated points of resistance. During the 
Opposite: "Invasion! The Gennan countenneasures 
are in progress!" 
initial hours of the 7 June advance, these 
were brushed aside as the 7th and 9th 
Canadian Infantry Brigades moved forward 
in two separate thrusts, while 8th Brigade 
dealt with the remaining German strong-
points in the rear areas. 
The 9th Brigade's push towards 
Carpiquet forced a German reaction to secure 
the staging areas for a co-ordinated move 
against the Allies. The initial German 
response was purely defensive. 
Standartenjuehrer Kurt Meyer intercepted the 
Canadian advance with a battlegroup 
composed of his 25th Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment and 50 PzKpfw IVs from the tank 
regiment's second battalion. 3 In the chaotic 
melee that erupted, the Germans managed to 
blunt and deflect the Canadian advance. 
Though 9th Brigade failed to seize their 
objectives, they did draw German attention 
from 7th Brigade which experienced only 
"moderate resistance," mainly "in the form of 
9 
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Lieutenant-Colonel F.M. Matheson, 
Commanding Officer, Regina Rifles 
snipers. "4 By noon D+ 1, 7th Brigade had 
settled down in anticipation of the expected 
German assault. The Regina Rifle Regiment 
established itself astride the Caen-Bayeux 
road at Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse. Major 
StuartTubb, commanding"C" Company, took 
one look at the approaches to Bretteville and 
decided to occupy the village of Norrey-en-
Bessin a kilometre to the south. This position 
would allow the Reginas to dominate the 
approaches to Bretteville and the railway 
embankment. Brigadier Harry Foster 
questioned this decision, but Lieutenant-
Colonel F.M. Matheson, the commanding 
officer of the Reginas, insisted that Major 
Tubbs had made the right decision. Foster 
accepted his judgement. 
Directly to the west, between the 
embankment and the highway, the Royal 
Winnipeg Rifles occupied Putot-en-Bessin. 
The Canadian Scottish Regiment took up a 
reserve position in Secqueville-en-Bessin. The 
7th Brigade in crossing the Caen-Bayeux 
road and seizing the "high ground" in and 
around Bretteville, posed a formidable 
obstacle to any German advance along the 
main lateral highway in Calvados. 
10 
The embankment provided the 
Canadians a significant barrier to German 
armour. In order to advance frontally against 
the brigade "fortress," the Germans were 
required to first capture the village of Norrey 
in order to gain a passage for their tanks 
across the embankment. The villages 
themselves, consisting of "stone buildings 
and narrow thoroughfares," greatly enhanced 
the defender's resilience. 5 The Brigade was 
also anchored on its left flank by the Mue 
River, which was lined with hedges and farm 
walls. Worse still for the 12th SS, the natural 
terrain of the area consisted of flat fields and 
gentle rises interspersed with small wooded 
areas. The Canadians were able to use the 
church towers to view enemy movements 
over a large area. 
The inherent advantages offered by 
terrain were not lost on the Canadians. The 
7th Brigade busied itself during the lull in the 
fighting "to prepare defenses for the counter-
attack which was almost sure to come."6 Not 
only were the troops given a "moment to relax 
and scrounge something to eat, 7 " but the 
Mqjor Stuart Tubbs, Commander, 
"C" Company, Regina Rifles 
3
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From left to right: Standartenfiihrer Kurt Meyer, commanderofthe 25thPanzerGrenadier Regiment, Gruppenfiihrer 
Fritz Witt, commander of 12th SS Panzer Division, Obergruppenfiihrer Sepp Dietrich, commander ofl SS Panzer 
Corps, Sturmbannfiihrer Hubert Meyer, and Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander-in-ChiefWest. 
formation's artillery and anti-tank guns were 
hustled into position. The guns of the 3rd 
Anti-Tank Regiment commanded the 
approaches to both flanks and had a clear 
line of sight over kilometres of flat and open 
terrain. The FOOs (Forward Observation 
Officers) of 12th and 13th Field Regiments 
were in position as were the machine guns 
and mortars of the Cameron Highlanders of 
Ottawa. 
The men of the Canadian 7th Brigade 
were first stirred into action by what appeared 
to be a probing attack by the newly-arrived 
26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. At 2100 
hours on 7 June, the defenders of Putot 
"quickly repulsed" a small group of German 
infantry. 8 The brigade could only expect an 
increase in German effort over the next 24 
hours. The 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 
owing to the greater distance it had to travel 
and the general lack of information regarding 
Allied positions, arrived many hours later 
than its sister formation. The Regiment 
established its headquarters in Cheux, 
approximately 2 kilometres from Norrey. 9 A 
potentially dangerous 7 kilometre gap between 
Rots and Audrieu was filled, and Meyer's 
25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment could 
breathe easier knowing their left flank was 
defended. 10 However, the flanks of the division 
were by no means secure. On the left, near 
Audrieu and Cristot, the 12th SS 
Reconnaissance Battalion formed the only 
obstacle to an Allied flanking attempt by the 
British 50th (Northum brian) Division. Panzer-
Lehr Division had not yet linked up with the 
12th ss. 
Early on 8 June, Field Marshal Erwin 
Rommel, realizing that time was running 
short, ordered the Seventh Army to throw the 
three armoured divisions of the I SS Panzer 
Corps at the advancing British and 
Canadians. 11 A concerted effort never 
occurred. The 21st Panzer Division, brushing 
11 
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12th SS Attacks on 7th Brigade. Note that this map is oriented as the Canadian soldiers would have viewed 
the battle, with south at the top of the map. Each thick arrow represents a 12th SS attack and the number 
indicates the date and time of the attack (ie. 08.0330-8 June, 3:30a.m.). 
the right sleeve of the HitleTjugend, had been 
so severely mauled on June 6th that it 
mustered only 55 tanks, and could not 
disengage from combat with 3rd British 
Division. 12 Kurt Meyer's 25th Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment had committed its three 
infantry battalions against the Canadians in 
the Buron area, and redeployment elsewhere 
was impossible without surrendering Caen. 13 
The I SS Panzer Corps could not immediately 
field the resources required for a 
comprehensive push to the sea. 
12 
Despite their inability to concentrate 
for a large counterattack against the Canadian 
and British divisions, the Germans were still 
determined to make preliminary moves for 
large-scale offensive operations. The villages 
of Norrey, Putot, and Bretteville, held by the 
7th Brigade, were to be cleared by the 26th 
Panzer Grenadier Regiment in order to open 
a corridor along the Caen-Bayeux road for the 
division's tanks. The three infantry battalions 
of the 26th Regiment were ordered to 
overwhelm the Canadians beginning in the 
early hours of 8 June. 14 
\ 
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.. D" Company, Regina Rifles 
at Cardonville, 8 June 1944 
On June 7th, "D" Company 
of the Reginas was at 
Villeneuve just south of the 
railway line with "B" Com-
pany to the north near Rots. 
After the Kurt Meyer group 
drove the 9th Brigade out of 
Authie, Buron and Gruchy ... 
Colonel Matheson recalled 
the two companies to 
Bretteville early on June 8th 
and placed "B" Company on 
the Caen-Bayeux road fac-
ing south-east. He put Ma-
jor Eric Syme in command 
of "Baker." He asked me to 
command "Dog" Company 
and to occupy Cardonville 
south-west of Bretteville 
astride the railway line ... 
My company was facing a 
farm just south of the rail-
way line then occupied by 
12th SS Panzer Grenadiers 
from Mahnke's 26th Regi-
ment ... 
It is clear now that the 
Germans thought that 
Norrey-en-Bessin, beingthe 
furthest penetration of Al-
lied Forces at that time,was 
to be used as the break-out 
point. They reckoned that 
Norreywas heavily defended 
with little behind it so they 
made a two-pronged attack. 
The western thrust came 
right at us. At least 14 
tanks sliced between "C" 
Company at Norrey and "D" 
Company at Cardonville. I 
know because I was there 
(in the dark). The ensuing 
battle was horrendous with 
the tanks circling our solid 
stone house and surround-
ing high stone walls. The 
night was lit by the burning 
barns at the farm and the 
tanks overran one platoon 
in the orchard behind the 
north wall crushing anti-
tank guns, carriers and sol-
diers. The tanks ultimately 
left what remained of us at 
first light as our Typhoons 
were ready to pounce. 
Mohnke then sent large 
numbers of Panzer Grena-
diers to attack "D" Company 
in broad daylight. Down to 
45 men and two offiers, 
myself and Lieutenant Dick 
Robt;:rts, we all had machine 
guns of one sort or another 
(several German) and were 
protected in our fortress-like 
position ... 
I talked to Colonel 
Clifford of the 13th Field 
Regiment who was with Fos-
ter Matheson and gave him 
coordinates for a 1 05-mm 
barrage on the Germans at 
the farm in front of our south 
wall. It was the best shoot 
that I ever saw in my nine 
months of action. The Ger-
mans were caught in open 
ground and had to with-
draw. 
Gordon Brown 
(Lt-Col. ret'd) 
April23, 1994 
At 0330 hours, under the cover of 
darkness, three companies ofthe 26th Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment's 1st Battalion moved 
north from their staging areas at Cheux. The 
Battalion hoped to envelop the Regina Rifle 
Regiment in Norrey by striking from two 
directions. The 1st and 3rd Companies 
pressed forward to the right of Norrey, while 
the 2nd Company moved to the left of the 
village. The German movements had not 
escaped Canadian attention. The Reginas 
reported several armoured personnel carriers 
churning their way towards Norrey and the 
embankment. 15 It appears that 
Sturmbannjuehrer Bernhard Krause's 
battalion had no intention of achieving 
surprise even though the attack was not 
supported by artillery. 
To the Reginas left, the German 1st and 
3rd Companies passed through St. Manvieu 
and crossed the Mue River. The Reginas 
reacted with a torrent of small arms fire 
supported by artillery. The advancing 
HitleTjugend threw themselves to the ground, 
suffering casualties, and a spray of machine-
gun fire struck down a company commander. 
The assault was temporarily suspended, and 
13 
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the two companies dug deep into the soil. The 
12th SS fared better on the Canadian right. 
The 2nd Company managed to move quickly 
past Norrey and charge across the 
embankment. However, the failure of the 
other two formations forced the extended 2nd 
Company to withdraw and entrench itself 
behind the embankment and within 
Cardonville - a group of houses near the 
edge of Bretteville. 16 
The Regina Rifle War Diary described 
the assault as a minor "counter-attack." 17 In 
fact, the Reginas had easily repulsed an enemy 
battalion hoping to force a breakthrough in a 
poorly executed operation. The assault had 
been undertaken without artillery support 
even though no efforts were made to surprise 
the entrenched opponents. Hubert Meyer 
insists that this serious failure was due to 
Canadian radio interference which prevented 
the forward observer from communicating 
Left: A forward outpost of the Regina Rifles in 
Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse, 8-10 June 1944. 
(Photo by D.I. Grant, NAC PA 129042) 
Below: A young trooper from the 12th SS. 
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with his battery. 18 Without the suppressing 
effect of artillery, the Hitlerjugend were quite 
vulnerable to Canadian fire. The 1st Battalion 
was continuously pounded by Canadian 
artillery throughout the attack, and the 
pinned-down German companies waited out 
the storm in forced silence. The assault cost 
the battalion approximately twenty-five 
casualties, while the Canadians suffered 
minimal losses. 19 That the Regina Rifle 
Regiment was unaware of the full extent of 
the attack's scale is a testament to their 
success. The Hitlerjugend had failed in their 
first push. 
The second attempt at a breakthrough 
came after dawn. To the immediate left of 
Krause's formation, the 2nd Battalion, 
commanded by Sturmbannfuehrer Siebken, 
had methodically advanced to its starting 
point around le Mesnil-Patry. Again 
highlighting the confusion present within the 
12th SS, the battalion delayed its assault for 
three hours owing to an order demanding 
careful progress forward. 20 It did not attack 
in conjunction with the 1st Battalion as 
planned. Neither did the Regiment's 3rd 
Battalion. 
Commanded by Sturmbannfuehrer Erich 
Olboeter, the 3rd Battalion along with the 
12th SS Reconnaissance Detachment or 
Aujklaerungsabteilung, were ordered to seize 
the villages to the immediate left of the 2nd 
Battalion in order to secure their flank. 21 As 
the Canadian 7th Brigade had not extended 
itself as far as Brouay, the German objective, 
Olboeter's troops seized the village without 
interference. The area was the responsibility 
of the British 50th Division, which had not 
yet advanced as far as the Canadians. The 
Reconnaissance Detachment established 
itself in Audrieu linking up with forward 
elements of Panzer Lehr. Positioned on the 
embankment, the Germans posed a threat to 
the axis between the British and Canadian 
divisions. 
However, British gunfire systematically 
pounded the Germans until they withdrew. 
Oberscharfuehrer Hans-Georg Kesslar of the 
3rd Battalion described the frightening results 
of the bombardment on an element of the 
Panzer-Lehr Division: 
We were offered a glimpse of the most 
horrific face of war. The enemy had 
systematically hacked an element of the 
Panzer-Lehr Division to pieces with heavy 
artillery. Beside the obliterated vehicles 
and weapons lay the pieces of our 
Comrades. Others hung from the trees. It 
commanded a dreadful silence.22 
In fact, the reconnaissance detachment could 
only watch as Audrieu and a nearby chateau 
were reduced to rubble by naval artillery. The 
troops were forced back about a kilometre to 
Cristot to construct a new defensive position. 23 
Artillery alone had forced the outcome. 
The one reverse the Canadians suffered 
on 8 June was caused by the 2nd Battalion's 
assault against the unprotected flank of the 
7th Brigade. At 0630 hours, Siebken's massed 
companies rushed the 1. 5 kilometre distance 
between le Mesnil-Patry and their objective of 
Putot. 24 Canadian radio interference was 
overcome and German artillery and mortars 
saturated the village with high-explosives 
before the Hitlerjugend stormed across a 
railway bridge in front of the Royal Winnipeg 
Rifles' "A" Company. 25 The Canadians resisted 
the initial assault, and the concentrated Bren 
and rifle fire "swept the enemy infantry away 
like a scythe to hay."26 Despite their losses, 
the young men of the 2nd Battalion "came on 
inexorably, taking little evasive action despite 
the heavy fire that greeted them. "27 The Royal 
Winnipeg Rifles remained steadfast. Finally 
sickened by their losses, the Hitlerjugend 
retreated to regroup. Hubert Meyer, the 
official historian of the 12th SS, records that 
the 2nd Battalion now understood the extent 
of the Canadian defensive preparations. 28 Not 
easily daunted, Siebken's troops prepared a 
second assault. 
Prior to their next advance, the Germans 
shelled Putot extensively. The bombardment, 
which included air-bursting "88" shells, 
inflicted heavy casualties on the Canadian 
defenders. 29 Oddly enough, snipers, thought 
to be from the 716th Infantry Division, "came 
to life in the buildings throughout the town 
and made it difficult to move in the whole 
battalion area. "30 Beginning at 0930 hours, 
15 
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the Panzer Grenadiers resumed the attack 
with a now more cautious advance around 
the Canadian strong points in Putot. By 
midday, the Hitlerjugend had crossed the 
embankment and overrun the village -
enveloping "A," "B" and "C" Companies. 31 
Exhausted and short of ammunition, the 
formations attempted to break out using the 
cover of a thick smoke-screen in order to link 
up with the still intact "D" Company. 32 Only 
a few soldiers managed to escape the 
encirclement, while the remainder "acquitted 
themselves like Napoleon's Guard at 
Waterloo. "33 With heavy losses on both sides, 
the Hitlerjugend had seized Putot. 
Third Canadian Division responded 
quickly. Four regiments of artillery were 
brought to bear on Putot, and the soldiers of 
the 2nd Battalion were sent scurrying for 
cover.34 The 12th SS withstood the heavy 
barrage, however, and it became painfully 
obvious that a counterattack was necessary 
to regain the village. 
Brigadier Harry Foster made quick 
preparations for the assault. At 1700 hours, 
a battlegroup was formed using the brigade's 
reserve battalion, the Canadian Scottish 
Regiment, reinforced by two squadrons from 
the 6th Armoured Regiment and elements of 
the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (MG). 
The attack would be supported by the 12th 
and 13th Field Artillery Regiments. The 
formation was to advance with two companies 
in the lead, two in reserve, with the squadrons 
of tanks covering the flanks. 35 The battlegrou p 
proceeded quickly towards their collection 
point at la Bergerie Farm woods, and 
assembled for action. It was hoped that the 
counterattack would begin at around 2030 
hours. 
Managing to meet the deadline, "D" and 
"C" Companies moved in behind a creeping 
barrage of exceptional force. 36 Mirroring the 
previous defenders of Putot, the dazed and 
exhausted Hitlerjugend manned their 
automatic weapons and sprayed the 
advancing battlegroup with machine-gun fire 
-killing two officers outright in the charge. 37 
Yet, the Panzer Grenadiers lacked the 
18 
equipment to repulse a determined assault 
supported by armour. The Germans had 
found it difficult to move anti-tank weaponry 
into Putot, owing to the interference of 
Canadian artillery, and shortages of infantry 
anti-tank weaponry. 38 The Hitlerjugend 
withdrew from Putot in the face of the 
Canadian attack, and streamed towards the 
embankment. Though the village was in 
Canadian hands by 2130 hours, the chaotic 
battle continued to rage on its perimeter, as 
small groups of men stumbled through the 
descending darkness. Captain P.F. Ramsey, 
second-in-command of "B" Company, 
Canadian Scottish Regiment, described the 
battlefield as a: 
... Hornet's Nest. No other term is quite 
so descriptive of that hot spot. Mortaring 
was still going on in strength and all the 
cacophony of the full dress infantry battle 
with artillery and tank support filled the 
still evening air. The distinctive Burrp of 
the German Machine Guns punctuated 
the staccato of the Bren. Over all was a fog 
of dust and smoke. 39 
The Canadian counterattack succeeded . 
and forced Siebken's 2nd Battalion to 
withdraw south of the embankment in order 
to regroup. 40 The Canadian Scottish dug-in 
and consolidated, while the badly mauled 
Royal Winnipeg Rifles withdrew to the rearY 
Putot had been retaken, and the brigade 
fortress was once again secure. 
The advance of the Hitlerjugend's 2nd 
Battalion had yielded nothing. Hubert Meyer 
states that German losses amounted to 19 
dead, 58 wounded and 21 missing- the 6th 
Company being effectively halved. 42 These 
statistics are almost certainly too low. 43 On 
the other hand, the Canadian Scottish 
suffered 125 casualties, while the Winnipeg 
Rifles incurred 256.44 The fighting for Putot 
had taken on a First World War dimension -
heavy attrition for limited gains. The 1st and 
2nd Battalions of the 26th Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment had failed to dislodge the Canadian 
7th Brigade from their defensive position, 
and the proposed route of advance to the sea 
remained shut. 
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Panther knocked out by Reginas using PlATs and grenades in Bretteville on the night of 8 June. 
From the tower of the imposing Abbey 
Ardennes, Kurt Meyer had monitored the 
dismal progress ofMoehnke's regiment during 
its fruitless attempts to clear the 7th Brigade 
off of the Caen-Bayeux road. The 
Standartenfuehrer was still concerned, 
however, with the movement of Canadian 9th 
Brigade into the Cairon region. Any concerted 
effort south through Rots threatened to divide 
the two Panzer Grenadier Regiments, and 
eliminate any planned offensive. 45 After 
further analysis, Meyer correctly discerned 
that the enemy concentration was defensive 
in nature. Since the 9th Brigade had been 
held in front of Carpiquet and Caen, and both 
Canadians and Germans were well 
entrenched, Meyer decided to turn his 
attention west- "I came to the conclusion to 
help my division on my regiment's left flank 
with a thrust towards Bayeux."46 Not only 
would such a move aid the hard-pressed 1st 
Battalion near Norrey, but it would close the 
four-mile gap between the two Panzer 
Grenadier Regiments. 47 The assault also 
promised to outflank the forward elements of 
(Photo by F.L. Dubervill. NAC PA 130149) 
the 7th Brigade in Norrey and trap them 
against the Caen-Bayeux highway. Meyer 
decided it was his turn to seize the staging 
areas for the drive to the sea. 
The Canadians anticipated a German 
move along the Caen-Bayeux highway. The 
Regina Rifles had reported groups of tanks 
advancing on their positions as early as 1220 
hours and again at 1700 hours. The War 
Diaries record that both assaults were 
repulsed. 48 Though Hubert Meyer maintains 
that the HWeTjugend had not conducted 
armoured operations that early in the day, 
suggesting that the Canadians had simply 
erred, it is evident that 3rd Division was 
assuming the next blow would fall in the area 
of Bretteville. 49 
Meyer's plan required the armour of 
Max Wuensche's 12th SS Panzer Regiment-
whose tanks were still assembling near 
Franqueville. 50 The plan called for the seizure 
of Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse prior to the 
advance towards Bayeux. 51 Why Meyer 
19 
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thought that he could easily breach the 
Canadian defenses, considering the 
difficulties of the 26th Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment, is difficult to understand. In 
comparison to the previous battles, the forces 
allocated to Meyer's grandiose operation were 
strangely small. The Kampjgruppe consisted 
of the 15th Kradschuetz or Motorcycle 
Company, two companies of the 1st Panzer 
Detachment, and a battery of self-propelled 
artillery. 52 The three motorized infantry 
battalions of the 25th Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment were fully committed against the 
Canadian 9th Brigade, and Meyer had to 
force a company of engineers into the line to 
free up the 15th Motorcycle Company for the 
assault. 53 Only when the preparations were 
completed did Meyer inform the divisional 
commander of his decision and he then went 
to sleep. 54 Meyer had decided to delay the 
attack until dusk to avoid the hazards of air 
attack. 
At approximately 2200 hours, the 
Kampfgruppe began to roll down the Caen-
Bayeux road towards Bretteville. The few 
infantrymen designated for the mission 
hopped onto the Panthers, and Meyer fulfilled 
his promise to the 15th Motorcycle Company 
by leading them into their first battle. 55 The 
group quickly by-passed the unoccupied 
village of le Bourg and crossed the Mue River 
on an intact bridge. Under the cover of 
twilight, the German armour advanced to 
within a few hundred meters of Bretteville 
before the Canadians opened fire. The 
Panthers halted. 56 
The torrent of Regina machine-gun fire 
was well aimed, and the commander of the 
15th Motorcycle Company was struck in the 
stomach - "he fell down to the road to the 
edge ofthe ditch."57 Meyer's motorcycle then 
took a direct hit which instantly killed the 
driver and set the Standartenjuehrerablaze. 58 
Meyer's men extinguished the fire, and the 
undaunted commander led the wildly-firing 
Panthers onto the objective. The six-pounders 
of the 3rd Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment, 
supporting "A" Company of the Regina Rifles 
with a single troop, claimed six tanks knocked-
out in the first charge. The Hitlerjugend 
attempted to shift the attack towards the 
20 
south, but other tanks were ignited by the 
accurate artillery fire. 59 
Tanks from the 4th Panzer Company 
then attempted to churn their way into the 
eastern edge of Bretteville, but anti-tank fire 
destroyed the command tank, and the infantry 
dismounted to storm forward on foot. 60 The 
Germans were taken aback by the ferocity of 
the Canadian response. "We were surprised 
by heavy anti-tank weapons."61 Due to the 
intense small arms fire, the small numbers of 
infantry could not press the attack and went 
to ground. The Kampjgruppe had shattered 
the Reginas' outer defenses- "several carriers 
were knocked out and their position 
overrun,"62 but before assaulting Bretteville 
itself, the German armour shelled the village 
at a distance of about 300 yards. This 
continued for approximately half an hour 
before the Panthers again ventured forward. 
At midnight, two German tanks approached 
the Regina headquarters. The Canadians 
swarmed the advancing armour. One Panther 
was dispatched with multiple PlAT hits and a 
"necklace of 75 grenades," and the other 
quickly withdrew after firing "like a child in a 
tantrum."63 Without sufficient infantry 
support, the 12th SS armour circled the 
village helplessly, and the fires they ignited 
with their 75-mm guns merely created more 
light for the Canadians to shoot by - "The 
whole sky was aglow with gun fire, blazing 
buildings and the dazzling of the Canadian 
Parachute flares, which illuminated the 
PANZERS for the defenders' anti-tank guns 
and blinded the German crews."64 It was 
difficult for the combatants to understand 
what was happening in the chaotic battle. At 
one point, a confused German officer rode his 
Volkswagen down the main street, 
"dismounted and gazed around for a few 
seconds until a PlAT gunner let fly a bomb 
which hit him directly."65 As late as 0445 
hours, the Hitlerjugend were putting in 
"determined attacks." 66 But without 
additional infantry there was little hope of 
success. 
Late in the assault, Meyer and Wuensche 
had attempted to reach the 1st Battalion of 
the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, in order 
to collect infantry to support the tanks, but 
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Sherman Firefly 17-pounder 
they were driven off by the heavy anti-tank 
fire. 67 Moreover, the 1st Battalion was pinned 
down by the single company in Norrey and 
they remained in their fox-holes. Reluctantly, 
Meyer ordered the withdrawal back to Rots. 68 
The Canadians had again repulsed a German 
attack. Altogether, the casualties of Meyer's 
Kampfgruppe totalled 152 with 43 dead. 69 
According to the Germans, at least six 
Panthers were destroyed, though the 
Canadians claimed twelve. The improvised 
assault had been repulsed, and the Canadian 
"fortress" inN arrey-Putot-Bretteville remained 
intact. 
The 12th SS had attempted to seize a 
defended position without sufficient infantry 
support. Meyer himself realized this as the 
fundamental reason for failure, though he 
was quick to cite the strength of the Canadian 
position. 70 However, it should have been 
plain to a man of his experience that infantry 
have inherent advantages over armour in 
close-quarter combat; they are able to swarm 
(Photo by Ken Belt NAC PA 131391) 
the tanks and get flank shots in individual 
vehicles. Denuded of their infantry, the 
Panthers were helpless. The most startling 
fact was Meyer's insistence on remaining in 
the Bretteville area for the rest of the night 
when success was plainly impossible. The 
Standartenfuehrer's actions might be 
considered those of a confused and desperate 
man. With no one was exercising command 
and control, confusion reigned. 
Throughout the assault on Bretteville, 
the 12th SS Panzer Regiment's 3rd Company 
sat idle in Authie. This formation was the last 
to arrive in the staging area near Franqueville 
and was unable to participate in the first 
attack on Bretteville. Kurt Meyer, who had 
intercepted the formation on a motorcycle, 
had initially ordered the Panthers to support 
the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment north of 
Caen. Though the 3rd Company crews heard 
the noise of a fierce battle to the southwest, 
they were not aware a major operation was 
being conducted. 71 
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At around 0900 hours on the morning 
of 9 June, the 3rd Company was replaced in 
the line by a detachment of PzKpfw IVs, 
allowing the company to rumble through Rots 
towards la Villeneuve on the Caen-Bayeux 
highway. When the company reached the 
junction, the crews received their first orders 
to assault Norrey. Together with an infantry 
attack from the 1st Battalion of the 26th 
Panzer Grenadier Regiment south of the 
village, the Panthers were ordered to Norrey 
with the support of a small number of infantry 
from the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. 
The assault would depend once more on 
surprise, as the 12th SS could provide no 
artillery support. 72 
Hubert Meyer states that no one knows 
who developed the plan for the assault. The 
commander of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment 
had been wounded, and was consequently 
being attended to at a field hospital. In all 
probability, the scheme was once again 
devised by Standartenjuehrer Kurt Meyer, 
who was being pressured to seize the staging 
areas for a German offensive. The villages 
controlled by the 7th Brigade were still 
considered vital starting-points for the plan 
to work. 73 The Panthers were ordered to 
launch their assault at 1300 hours when the 
Tactical Air Forces, still based in Britain, 
would be absent. 
From la Villeneuve, the 3rd Company 
crossed the rail embankment through an 
underpass, turned right and deployed for 
battle. The 12 Panthers fanned out in a single 
line at a right-angle to the embankment. A 
few minutes past 1230 hours, the company 
began the attack on Norrey - across open 
and flat terrain covered by wheatfields. 74 The 
company was led by Hauptmann Luedemann, 
as the commander, Oberststurmfuehrer von 
Ribbentrop, had been wounded earlier. 
Though von Ribbentrop merely watched 
from the rear area along with Max Wuensche, 
he had recommended that the company drive 
at high speeds in a broad front- only stopping 
to fire their 75-mm guns. Luedemann followed 
Ribbentrop's advice, and the infantry were 
left far behind. 75 
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As the Panthers approached the village, 
not yet facing any enemy fire, Luedemann 
ordered the company to swing left. The five 
tanks of the 3rd section hugging the rail 
embankment were forced to speed past the 
2nd section in order to keep a solid line of 
tanks facing N orrey. The four tanks of the 1st 
section had by this point slowed to form a 
reserve. Although the order to swing left, 
presenting the Panther's thicker frontal 
armour to the Canadian defenders in Norrey, 
was an understandable action, it had 
consequences that the HitleTjugend had not 
anticipated. 
Nine Sherman tanks including several 
"Fireflys" equipped with the 17 -pounder, were 
being moved towards the front to reinforce 
the Reginas' position in Norrey. As the tanks, 
from the Elgin Regiment, were making a detour 
in front of the village when they spotted the 
advancing Panthers. Catastrophically for the 
3rd Panzer Company, the swing to the left, 
though protecting them from the 6-pounders 
in Norrey, exposed their flanks to the 
Shermans at not more than 1000 metres 
distance. The Canadian tanks deployed in a 
straight line and opened fire. 76 A "Firefly" 
commanded by Lieu tenant Henry hit the tank 
nearest the rail-line first. Adolf Morawetz 
thought he had struck a mine; "after a dull 
bang and shaking, as if the tracks had been 
ripped off, the tank came to a standstill. "77 
After another bang, the ammunition for the 
MG-42 ignited and the Panther burst into 
flames. Before Morawetz desperately 
attempted to open the hatch he had just 
closed, he looked through his periscope and 
watched as the neighbouring Panther 
exploded- throwing the turret into the air. 
Morawetz survived, but his tank and crew 
had been destroyed. Six other Panthers were 
quickly dispatched in the next four minutes. 
The survivors, including the badly burned 
crews who had bailed out of their destroyed 
tanks, fled back towards the underpass. The 
infantry were forced to join the men of the 2nd 
Company under the bridge, as an artillery 
barrage began to pound the area inflicting 
heavy casualties. The converging attack of 
the 1st Battalion of the 25th Panzer Grenadiers 
never materialized. The assault was a 
complete and total failure. 78 
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The face of defeat: a panzer-grenadier from the 12th 
SS captured by the Canadians. 
The gallant stand of the 7th Brigade 
against Hitlerjugend impressed two thoughts 
on the mind of the German commanders. 
First, since the 12th SS was unable to throw 
the Canadians off the Caen-Bayeux highway, 
the planned drive to the sea was considered 
hopeless. General Geyrvon Schweppenburg, 
commander of the recently activated Panzer 
Group West, visited Kurt Meyer at the Abbaye 
Ardenne on 9 June to evaluate the progress of 
the Hitlerjugend. On hearing the 
Standartenfuehrer's report, von 
Schweppenburg uttered a sardonic reply -
"My dear Meyer, the war can only now be won 
through political means."79 The command 
structure in disarray, the Germans and the 
12th SS were now firmly on the defensive. 
A second thought was impressed on the 
minds of the officers and men of the 12th SS. 
The Canadian 3rd Division was considered a 
formation of exceptional skill, and the artillery 
which they commanded inspired nothing short 
of fear. Allied high explosives had time and 
again inflicted severe wounds on the 
Hitlerjugend. Hubert Meyer summarized this 
feeling: 
The anti-tank weapons around Bretteville 
were so powerful that outflanking 
movements to the north and south were 
thwarted. The surprising employment of 
parachute magnesium flares blinded the 
Panthers and lighted clear targets for the 
enemy anti-tank guns. Our opponents 
were especially strong on the defensive, 
and they did not allow themselves to be 
surprised. They fought ferociously and 
bravely. 80 
On the other hand, the Canadians were 
less than impressed with German offensive 
capabilities, though they did not question 
their enemy's spirit. Brigadier Harry Foster, 
commander of 7th Brigade, pointed out that 
the 12th SS did not attempt to take advantage 
of the open flanks of the Regina Rifles, and 
the "enemy flung himself straight against the 
strongest points and utterly failed to exploit 
the undoubted weakness of his opponent's 
position."81 Even C.P. Stacey argues that the 
Hitlerjugend assaults "leave the impression 
of rather hasty and ineffective improvisation. 
The attacks were pressed with courage 
and determination but with no particular 
skill . . . the operations seem to have been 
locally conceived and control on the divisional 
level was ineffective."82 The disjointed timing 
of the assaults, with Kurt Meyer's 
Kampjgruppe advancing on Bretteville hours 
after the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment 
had been repulsed from Putot and Norrey, 
suggests that the regiments were not 
communicating effectively, if at all. That 
Meyer and Wuensche were forced to drive 
towards the 1st Battalion, in order to scrape 
up support for their failing assault, was 
indicative of a general lack of communication, 
command and control. Clearly, the 
Hitlerjugend efforts were not those of an 
exceptional division. 
The battles also highlight the problems 
of offensive action in Normandy. The fields 
around Caen were relatively open and the 
notorious "bocage" lay to the Canadian right. 
The battle area seemed to furnish ideal tank 
country owing to its apparent lack of 
significant obstacles, but it also provided 
ideal conditions for anti-tank gunners. The 
German Panthers paid a heavy price for 
movement out of dug-in defenses. 
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It is evident that the 12th SS was not 
capable of conducting successful offensive 
operations against prepared positions in 
Normandy. Artillery and anti-tankguns were 
the key to victory, and the Allies possessed 
large numbers ofthese effective weapons. All 
of the German assaults were checked and 
defeated in detail. The 3rd Canadian Division 
had won a decisive victory. 
This study has shown the need for re-
evaluating the traditional arguments about 
the military effectiveness of 12th SS and 3rd 
Canadian Infantry Divisions. If the true 
nature of the Normandy campaign is to be 
understood the historian must avoid a 
simplistic approach. The strengths and 
weaknesses of specific military operations 
must be evaluated without relying on broad 
generalizations. Only then can the myths be 
swept away. The initial Normandy battles 
were significantly influenced by the 
relationship of heavy weaponry to terrain, as 
well as by command and control problems. It 
became evident that offensive operations had 
become dangerous undertakings - a reality 
that would plague the Allies for the remainder 
of the Normandy campaign, and give rise to 
the myth of German military superiority. If 
only the initial battles were to be considered, 
a German army official historian might 
conclude, in words borrowed from C.P. 
Stacey:83 
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While it seems clear that lack of battle 
experience hampered the German forma-
tions in Normandy one must remark that 
although some of the Allied divisions were 
subject to the same disability it appears to 
have had a less serious effect on them. The 
3rd Canadian Division which was responsi-
ble for many of our troubles was formed in 
1940 but had never fought before 6 June 
1944. Moreover it did not contain a high 
proportion of experienced officers and NCOs. 
There were also other Allied Divisions in 
Normandy which had not fought before and 
which nevertheless gave a very good ac-
count of themselves. This may have been 
due to the fact that heavy reverses were 
suffered when Allied divisions were on the 
defensive when ours were attacking, a more 
difficult role. Nevertheless one suspects 
that the Allies contrived to get more out of 
their training than we did ... 
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